1. Israel (Against)
Always Mr. Safety. Many predicted that Netanyahu’s political career would be an additional casualty of Hamas’ attacks on Israel on October 7. But its recent bold shift toward expanding the offensive against Lebanon-based Hezbollah may have given it some breathing space. The tit-for-tat attacks accelerated beginning in July with Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah commander Fouad Shukr, Hezbollah’s retaliatory rocket attacks, Israel’s pager attack and, most importantly, the recent assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, the senior leader of Hezbollah. Our data shows both the decline that preceded these developments and the rebound that followed: Remarkably, Netanyahu’s poll numbers are currently slightly lower than before October 7.
But we think the story that Netanyahu’s political fortunes have completely reversed is premature. Despite Netanyahu’s personal rebound, Israelis are far from regaining their optimism about the direction their country is taking, as evidenced by the net share of adults who believe Israel is moving in the right direction (graph below). We would generally expect to see this measure bounce back on the heels of a major political event in tandem with the leader’s endorsement. Although this broader indicator saw a slight rebound in July with the assassination of Hamas leader Shukr and operations against Hezbollah, it began to decline again in mid-August and September, and to around -55 on a 30-day rolling basis, which is close to a low compared to recent years.
While Netanyahu may be relatively high at the moment, given the underlying societal gloom inferred from our measure of right direction, any misstep could cause him to lose his current moment of grace. Iran’s October 1 missile attack – a cross-arc shot warning of the possibility of direct conflict – will necessarily up the ante at a time when our data suggests many Israelis appear to be considering Netanyahu as the leader they need, rather than the leader they need. can give them the Israel they want.
2. Attacks in Lebanon (counterattack)
Mixed messages. The diplomatic repudiation of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was full screen during his speech to the United Nations General Assembly last week, just days after a series of Israeli attacks targeting Hezbollah militants in Lebanon. But the first Israeli attacks using pagers and walkie-talkies on Lebanese soil, and others that followed, did not arouse the anger of global public opinion, at least not more than the country has already done. The average net preference for Israel remained relatively stable during the period surrounding the attacks (first chart below); nor did we see any change in the intensity of preferences (second graph below), although the share of people with an uncertain view of Israel increased slightly after the initial attacks. The much lower number of civilian casualties to date compared to the conflict in Gazaas well as limited public familiarity with Hezbollah or simply conflict fatigue, are all possible explanations for this “dog that didn’t bark” scenario.
At the same time, public sympathy for Hamas remains deeply negative and not improving, underscoring that while global populations may have deep sympathy for the Palestinians, their support does not extend to militant organizations. like Hamas, and probably Hezbollah.
In the context of the ongoing conflict with Hamas, all of this portends a business-as-usual scenario, with the conflict in Lebanon doing little to put additional pressure on Israel from a reputational perspective. This may change in the coming days: our data shows very preliminary signs of a possible slowdown in net favorability toward Israel in the context of its just-launched ground incursion into southern Lebanon, but it is still too early to say whether the change in sentiment will prove significant. Unless there is a substantial increase in civilian casualties, we do not expect this to happen.
For U.S. companies doing business in the region who remain concerned about negative repercussions (e.g., additional boycotts) arising from a further deterioration of America’s view amid continued military support for Israel, we We have yet to see such risks materialize in our data: Regional Average America’s net favorability in the Middle East is moving largely sideways in the context of the conflict with Hezbollah. But it remains significantly depressed compared to September 2023, suggesting that conflict-related business risks persist. See our Tracking America’s Global Reputation for the latest data available on this front when it is updated later this month.
3. Austria (Counter)
Mirror mirror. The FPÖ came first in the Austrian elections on September 29, with a provisional score. 28.9% of the vote and triggering a new round of self-reflections in Europe on the continent’s shift to the political right. The party is a clear example of a European far-right party. Some of his founders were members of the Nazi Party and part of the SS. Parlgov’s database ranking parties on a 10-point left-right spectrum, with 10 being the furthest to the right, gives the FPÖ at 8.3 (the AfD in Germany is at 8.8 and the National Rally in France is 9.3).
The election result itself is hardly a surprise. Our data showed that more Austrians cite the FPÖ as the party that most closely aligns with their own views throughout the year, and this share has continued to increase.
But the party’s supporters are either too shy to present themselves as far-right ideologues, or they don’t really see themselves as such. A majority of Austrians identifying the party as having views closest to their own over the past 90 days nevertheless identify as centrist or just right of center, which corresponds to the values of 4 and 5 in the table below.
There is probably both a deliberate denial of their true views and a real political disconnect between the views of Austrians who voted for the FPÖ and those of the party itself. Regarding the first case, we observe a similar trend of hesitancy to identify as far-right among German and Dutch respondents, who tend to be more reluctant to express strong opinions. In Germany at least, there is still a very strong cultural taboo against identifying with the right, dating back to the Nazi period. Supporters of Germany’s far-right AfD, for example, are still hesitant to claim such political views themselves, with only 16% doing so – a proportion consistent with what we see in Austria. Compare this to France, where the traditional taboo of espousing far-right views appears well and truly broken after recent parliamentary and European parliamentary debates. early national elections. More than half of those who say they are in favor of the National Rally also say they have far-right opinions themselves. Just like in France, it is also very uncertain whether the FPÖ will enter the government or whether other parties will unite to exclude it.
Austria is culturally and historically more similar to Germany than to France, which partly explains Austrians’ reluctance to hold extreme views. However, in previous research we have also noted that across EuropeIt appears to be disillusionment with the high cost of living, perceived uncontrollable immigration, and elites out of touch with reality that has driven otherwise centrist voters into the arms of the far right. There is a major gap in almost every country between those who support a far-right party and those who self-identify as far-right. Europe’s center right, take note.
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