Whoever wins the US presidential election in November, American foreign policy will be upended and the world will be more uncertain. But liberal democracies like Australia have some room to maneuver: we can respond by building on existing partnerships and creating new ones with like-minded countries to maintain the rules-based global order.
The stakes could not be higher. The first land war in Europe since 1945, the latest phase of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and a technological and commercial cold war in the Indo-Pacific. The Russia-China-North Korea-Iran axis is determined to reshape the international order to make the world safer for autocracies. Gray zone activity is at an all-time high, with open societies being targeted by disinformation, misinformation, and cyber disruption.
The next president will have to deal with allies and partners who are doing more for themselves.
Former President Donald Trump served as commander-in-chief of the United States military, and Vice President Kamala Harris was President Joe Biden’s understudy. However, Biden’s foreign policy skills will be missed. He brought allies and partners together after the Trump years. He rallied NATO in the face of Russian aggression, brought Japan and South Korea closer together, an important legacy of his presidency, and promoted new groupings such as AUKUS, the Quad leaders’ meeting, and other mini-groupings in the Indo-Pacific. He also brought the United States back to the Pacific and actively engaged with ASEAN countries. This focus is likely to continue under Harris.
Economic and trade engagement has been the Achilles heel of the Biden administration. Indo-Pacific Economic Framework The United States has taken useful initiatives on supply chains, but has failed to convince its allies and partners due to the lack of market access proposals. Both political parties in the United States are wary of such trade agreements, given public concern about job losses attributed to international trade, and in particular to opening up to China.
But the next president will have to contend with allies and partners who are doing more for themselves. Military spending is rising across the Indo-Pacific region. Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are stepping up their efforts, as is Australia. We are seeing increased regional cooperation among them and with the United States. In Europe, NATO has found new purpose and resolve.
Trump suggests that he can create a more peaceful global environment because he can deal with strongmen Russia, China, and North Korea, who respect him, and vice versa. If he wins, we should expect more left-wing moves, such as his approach to Kim Jong-un. Such lateral thinking may have its uses, but a foreign policy that boils down to America first and America alone dilutes America’s unique geostrategic advantage and its unmatched network of allies and partners. In such an environment, liberal democracies will have to consider what more they can do to fill this void.
Trump would settle the war in Ukraine in a day, not through Kissinger-style shuttle diplomacy, but by putting pressure on Ukraine, probably on terms more favorable to Russia. Congress will have its say on the matter, not necessarily to Trump’s liking. Ukraine is seeking to do more now—as evidenced by the incursion into Russian territory—to be able to put pressure on Ukraine in negotiations.
Trump wants the Israelis to finish the job in Gaza as soon as possible and is diligently seeking the Jewish vote. There is no guarantee of a quick end to the fighting, and the fate of Gaza after the war will be a delicate foreign policy test for the next American president. Escalating tensions with Iran will complicate the Gaza issue and will require patient and skillful diplomacy, particularly to rein in Benjamin Netanyahu and prevent a widening of the conflict.
Trump announced a 60% tariff on Chinese exports to the United States. Since he imposed tariffs on China in his first term, the trade deficit has widened in China’s favor. Biden has not removed the Trump-era tariffs, a now bipartisan policy. Trump (and Biden) were right to recognize that China has manipulated the international trading system to its advantage and has refused any meaningful reciprocity in trade and investment.
Tariffs, however, will not solve this problem. Trade imbalances arise from the balance between domestic savings and investment. China must consume more and save (and invest) less, and vice versa for the United States. In the absence of such adjustments, imbalances will continue to fuel restrictive trade measures. Combined with 10 percent tariffs on all markets, these measures could well trigger a trade war and policies of each against its neighbor.
China could offer Trump a grand trade deal to avoid high tariffs. China could offer to buy more from the United States in exchange for, among other things, security guarantees in the South China Sea and Taiwan. Trump might be tempted – he has rebelled against The US security guarantee to Taiwan and its dominance in the chip market. However, Republicans are generally very supportive of Taiwan (and even want to recognize Taipei, a red line for Beijing), which could slow down such an agreement.
Trump is unlikely to abandon AUKUS, which has broad support on Capitol Hill and in national security circles. He may seek more Australian funding for the US submarine industrial base. His administration has revived the Quad at the foreign minister level, so he is also likely to agree to leaders’ meetings continuing. He will likely tighten technological controls on China and encourage more offshoring of supply chains critical to national security. Don’t expect the same level of interest in the Pacific or ASEAN.
Harris should retain much of the Biden team, with the possible exception of Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, given the difficult past four years. Harris likes Kurt Campbell, and retaining him in a senior role in the administration would ensure continuity of Indo-Pacific policy and the completion of AUKUS.
The tone could change. As we saw with Harris’ comments on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, she could also adopt a slightly more skeptical stance toward India. Overall, we can expect a greater emphasis on democracy and human rights, but not at the expense of core interests. Harris will also focus on countering technological competition with China. Space and artificial intelligence already figure prominently in her thinking.
Whoever is in power over the next four years, Australia has an opportunity to use diplomatic creativity to put new issues on the table. The most challenging and rewarding area will be trade-related market access measures, perhaps starting with a digital trade agreement to combat digital authoritarianism in the Indo-Pacific region.
