Today, we’re exploring how the U.S. presidential election on Nov. 5 between VP Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump will affect global politics.
To begin with, the fundamental trends in U.S. foreign policy seen since the start of Trump’s first term in 2017 are unlikely to dramatically change. Those trends include a retrenchment on globalization, as most clearly evidenced by growing trade protectionism and stricter measures limiting immigration. U.S. foreign policy is also increasingly defined by geopolitical competition, primarily with China, but also with its autocratic “axis” of Russia, Iran and North Korea.
Both shifts have weakened the multilateralism at the heart of the liberal international order that Washington has historically championed, if inconsistently. Harris and Trump differ greatly in how they will shape and manage these enduring shifts and what they see as their end goals. But neither is likely to reverse course on them.
The same could be said for a select few alliances, namely Israel and those in East Asia, including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Israel would likely receive more unconditional support from Trump, who has been less critical of its conduct of the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, while U.S. allies in East Asia would have to navigate a more complicated and transactional landscape should he return to the White House than they would under Harris. But besides the nuances of how U.S. support for these allies will be manifested, Washington’s focus on shoring up partnerships to counter China means that neither candidate can afford to abandon them.
The same cannot be said for U.S. allies in Europe. Trump has long shown both a hostility to the U.S. trans-Atlantic alliance system and an affinity for strongmen and populists in the region, particularly Russian President Vladimir Putin. He reportedly tried and failed to exit NATO during his first term, and a return to the White House would likely see a significant decrease of U.S. support for NATO and Ukraine, if not an outright abandonment of those alliances. His return to office would also likely lead to more friction in the U.S.-EU economic relationship. Harris, on the other hand, has said she would continue to support Ukraine in defending itself against Russia’s invasion, as well as U.S. allies in Europe.
More broadly, Harris and Trump differ greatly in what they see as the goal of U.S. retrenchment on globalization. As columnist Mary Gallagher wrote earlier this week, while Harris views protectionist measures as necessary but temporary strategic tools, Trump views them as part of a broader plan to shift the U.S. to being a more isolationist and autarkic country. Both views are likely to complicate relations with partners around the world. But Harris is more likely to maintain a level of cooperativeness and consultation that could ease the resulting tensions, especially as the U.S. maintains its alliance system. Trump’s tactics, on the other hand, are more likely to exacerbate those tensions.
Still, the biggest potential impact of the U.S. election will be on the country’s commitment to democracy. When Biden took office, he re-embraced Washington’s historical support for democracy as a pillar of U.S. foreign relations, if often a declarative and symbolic one. And while the Biden administration’s actions reflected the pragmatic realism that has consistently characterized U.S. foreign policy, that declarative commitment to democracy was and still is important. In the instances in which U.S. interests and human rights overlap, U.S. influence can move the needle in support of popular resistance to repressive regimes and justice for individual human rights defenders. A potential Harris administration will almost certainly maintain that stance.
If Trump returns to the White House, on the other hand, democracy abroad would be a non-issue. But more alarmingly, democracy at home would be in grave danger. Trump’s authoritarian instincts were on display during his first term, most clearly in his efforts to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election, which culminated in the attack on the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. At best, that attack was an insurrection; at worst, it was an attempted coup.
In the run-up to next week’s election, Trump has made a growing number of anti-democratic threats, including against his opponents and the press. Regardless of whether he can follow through on those threats, he will certainly try. And the institutional guardrails that contained his authoritarian impulses during his first term may not be as effective if he wins a second term, especially now that he has fully captured the Republican Party.
Ultimately, the most important factor that defines how the U.S. engages with the rest of the world is how the U.S. defines itself. That is what makes the stakes of the U.S. presidential election so high for the rest of the world: Donald Trump’s threat to U.S. democracy poses a threat to the very definition of the United States.
U.S. airstrikes hit multiple Islamic State camps in Syria on Monday, the U.S. military said. The strikes targeted several senior leaders in the group and killed at least 35 Islamic States operatives, with no known civilian casualties, according to the statement.
The Islamic State has enjoyed something of a resurgence in Syria and Iraq this year, claiming responsibility for more attacks than in previous years. But, as we highlighted in a Daily Review in July, focusing only on those attacks can be deceptive, as it ignores how the Islamic State has shifted its structure and strategy in recent years to become an interconnected global organization.
Bolivian President Luis Arce called yesterday for an end to the highway blockades organized by supporters of his rival, former President Evo Morales. The blockades have cut off some parts of the country and, according to Arce, cost the country’s economy more than $1.7 billion.
The power struggle between Arce and Morales—once allies and both from the same party—has spiraled into a political crisis that has paralyzed Bolivia’s government. And as Thomas Graham wrote in June, the impact of the political crisis has only exacerbated Bolivia’s slow-motion economic crisis, leading to growing unrest.
Mexico is on track to pass a law that would prevent legal challenges to constitutional amendments in the coming days, a move criticized by legal scholars and human rights observers. The law would remove even more power from Mexico’s judicial branch, which was already subject to sweeping reforms in September that will see judges elected rather than appointed. Those reforms prompted eight of the country’s 11 Supreme Court justices to submit resignation letters Wednesday, saying they will step down rather than stand for election.
Read more about the controversial judicial reforms, which observers have called a blatant power grab by the ruling party, in this column by Frida Ghitis.
Venezuela’s Foreign Relations Ministry said in a statement that it had summoned Brazil’s top diplomat in Caracas, in response to Brazil’s veto of a Venezuelan request to become a partner of BRICS at the group’s annual summit last week. As James Bosworth wrote, the veto was a victory for Brazilian diplomacy, complicating efforts by Russia and China to define the group’s trajectory.