The result of the elections in Venezuela is not yet certain

For now, Maduro, in power for more than a decade, is waging a fierce campaign for re-election, denouncing the opposition as “fascist” traitors and puppets of the United States. Nonetheless, the Venezuelan electorate is poised to vote overwhelmingly for Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia, a modest retired career diplomat who became the opposition’s “accidental candidate.” Gonzalez is running to replace Maria Corina Machado, the winner of the opposition primary banned by the government from holding office; he enjoys the support of Machado as well as a broad coalition of political parties.

The regime could still find a way to disqualify Gonzalez, just as it did Machado and its first choice as an alternate candidate. It could also try to avoid any scrutiny of the elections by disinviting credible international observers, as it has already done with the European Union. But momentum is now building ahead of the July 28 election, with politicians crisscrossing the country, parties and civic groups organizing to monitor the vote, and voters eager to cast their ballots in the first election significant presidential election of Venezuela for 11 years. Seven million Venezuelans have emigrated in recent years to escape Maduro’s authoritarian rule and economic mismanagement, and most of those who remain are desperate restore democracy and economic growth.

Many analysts expect Maduro to simply emulate Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo, who with apparent ease banned and imprisoned all credible opposition candidates during the 2021 presidential election in this country and subsequently eliminated all vestiges of political opposition. But Venezuela has a dynamic that Nicaragua, now considered a dictatorship, lacks: a popular national opposition leader in Machado, a candidate around whom voters rally in Gonzalez, a strong civil society, a mobilized electorate and an international community monitoring electoral developments.

Maduro could achieve a competitive result if voter turnout remains low or, as the opposition fears, if the regime manipulates results at polling stations in isolated locations where Gonzalez’s campaign could lack support. observers. But if the government fails to curb opposition participation and Maduro loses the election handily, the regime will find it difficult to simply ignore the people’s verdict by using the law to disqualify the victorious opposition and deploying force against any further demonstrations to remain in power. In case of clear and overwhelming answer opposition victory Ratified by election observers, crowds of Venezuelans would celebrate in the streets and governments around the world would congratulate Gonzalez and recognize him as president-elect. Meanwhile, regional democratic leaders with ties to Maduro – such as Presidents Gustavo Petro and Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva of Colombia and Brazil, respectively – are reportedly quietly pushing him to accept the outcome and begin a transition.

Under these circumstances, it would be very risky for Maduro to attempt to stay in power. Would the Venezuelan armed forces, although a politicized institution that supports the regime, carry out the orders for violent repression of demonstrators coming from a president who has just been categorically rejected by the population? Would the allies of Maduro’s party, seeking to preserve their political future, submit to international sanctions and the anger of the Venezuelan population for the sake of a disowned leader? Or, on the contrary, could the current investigation by the International Criminal Court into crimes against humanity committed by the regime give military commanders, rank-and-file soldiers and political elites pause?

The truth is that no one knows. The allure of maintaining power, combined with animosity toward political opposition and fear of reprisals, could be so great that the government’s political and military apparatus would not hesitate to act to ensure the survival of the regime .

But this approach could backfire against Maduro and his allies. History is replete with examples of “people power” defeating seemingly indomitable regimes.

A crackdown by the regime could therefore make it more likely, rather than less likely, that Maduro will face what he fears most: prosecution in Venezuela, or by the US Department of Justice or the International Criminal Court.

Maduro may not recognize it yet, but it would be in his interests – not to mention those of millions of Venezuelans who want to avoid further bloodshed and repression – for him to accept the election result if he loses. . Machado and Gonzalez have signaled publicly and privately that they are willing to negotiate guarantees for the regime and ensure that the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela, PSUV, plays a role in a democratic Venezuela. The opposition understands that, despite Maduro’s deep unpopularity, the movement launched by his deceased predecessor, former President Hugo Chavez, retains significant support and that governing effectively will require reconciliation between supporters and opponents of the regime. This could even be an opportunity for the PSUV to transform itself into a mainstream social democratic party, like many left-wing governments in America and Europe.

This is not to say that negotiating a transition would be easy. On the contrary, as many other countries have found, finding the right balance between responsibility and pragmatism can be difficult. Human rights organizations will rightly insist that there will be no pardon for abuses committed by the regime, particularly when it comes to crimes against humanity. Political negotiators will weigh the quest for justice against other imperatives, such as control of government agencies and security forces.

The United States will also have a role to play in promoting a democratic transition. To facilitate negotiations, Venezuelan opposition negotiators will likely ask President Joe Biden’s administration to offer to lift Maduro’s State Department bounty and, more problematically, the Department of Justice’s indictment. Justice of the Venezuelan leader and other senior officials for drug trafficking.

These would be tough calls for Biden to make, but they are dilemmas the administration would welcome. The fact that an acceptable election in Venezuela is still a plausible possibility is due in large part to the will of the government skilled in exploiting economic sanctions and other incentives, while synchronizing its diplomacy with key countries in the region. Helping Maduro understand that his interests can be consistent with those of his perceived enemies could lead to a historic outcome in Venezuela this year.

This article was originally published by World Politics Review.