Author: Thomas Pepinsky, Cornell University
The United States is less than a year away from its next presidential election. Although former President Donald Trump faces numerous civil and criminal charges, he will most likely be the Republican Party’s nominee for the third election in a row. Incumbent President Joe Biden will run for office on the Democratic Party, hoping the country strong economic performance will allay voters’ concerns about his age and suitability for office.
The campaign for the 2024 presidential election comes at a time of uncertainty in international politics. The United States and China are looking for a new foot, Israel continues its invasion of Gaza in response to Hamas’ terrorist actions and war crimes, and Ukraine continues to mount successful armed resistance to Russia’s illegal invasion. The Indo-Pacific security architecture is also evolving, with new initiatives such as AUKUS And the Quad bring Australia closer to the United States as central player in the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy.
The prospects of a second Trump presidency for America’s allies in the Asia-Pacific region are bleak. Trump has a serious chance of being re-elected. He is the face of the Republican Party and survey in progress shows Trump neck and neck with Biden. Although horse racing polls taken this long before elections are notoriously unreliable, the signals they send should not be ignored.
Trump’s second term may well be more extreme than his first term. Trump’s primary policy concerns are domestic, driven by his belief that he faces a lengthy prison sentence if convicted of even a subset of his crimes. But he also understands that his political supporters happily approve of dictatorial methods whether it is used against Democrats, progressives, Muslims, immigrants or their allies.
Trump would have pledged to appoint loyal supporters in traditionally non-partisan and professionalized positions. He would have plans to surround himself with courtiers who will carry out his most dangerous ideas on how to use federal power to crush his perceived enemies at home.
Unlike his first term, Trump now understands that his personal destiny depends on his ability to act decisively against major American institutions. It’s no secret, it’s his campaign program. He has a political team that will allow him to do this as soon as he takes office. After failing, on January 6, 2021, to overthrow American democracy from the outside seditious plothe will try to overthrow it from within, using executive power.
Because the federal government plays a central role in U.S. diplomacy, defense, and foreign policy, such actions will have repercussions far beyond America’s borders. Given Trump’s affection for Russian President Vladimir Putin, his willingness to sacrifice Ukrainian national security for personal gain, and the decline of moderate internationalist Republicans. in Congress, many options are on the table for American policy in Europe. They include a unilateral withdrawal from NATO and a permanent end to military support for Ukraine. This focus on NATO and Russia means that America’s European allies stand to lose the most from Trump’s second presidency.
Trump is also not committed to maintaining the status quo of the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region. Yet it is unclear how much he understands or cares about the region, beyond his flippant anti-China rhetoric and curiosity about Kim Jong-un. Trump’s relative indifference toward Asia suggests that America’s allies in the Indo-Pacific region may not fare as badly under a second Trump administration as their European allies, but l Uncertainty itself poses a threat to the regional strategic order.
Although the Emerging Hamas-Putin partnership If this complicates Trump’s Middle East policy, Trump will likely align himself with segments of Israeli society that seek a maximalist solution to the conflict. This solution could include a permanent reoccupation of Gaza, more settler violence in the West Bank, a massive and permanent displacement of Palestinian civilians, and a decisive end to the fragile status quo in Jerusalem’s holy sites.
Any of these outcomes would strain America’s alliances. There is no appetite for more civilian deaths and the settler movement enjoys no lasting support outside of Israel.
Biden’s leadership on foreign policy has largely been a boon to his allies and partners around the world. Despite the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the subsequent return of the Taliban and AUKUS deployment which has raised concerns among NATO allies in Europe, Biden believes in multilateral institutions. He understands that the United States has built a world order that ensures security and prosperity for the Americans. This same order has also brought stability, security and prosperity to key allies in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Australia.
Biden has guided the United States through a difficult period in world politics. Despite his mistakes and the biases inherent in superpower diplomacy and foreign policy, Biden is beyond doubt. understands the principles of multilateralism and follows them when he can.
Because Trump is an inherently oppositional figure, his policies are rejecting. If Biden supports American leadership, multilateral institutions, and foreign policy cooperation, Trump will pursue the opposite. Although the immediate consequences are likely to be worse for the United States’ allies in the North Atlantic, partners in the Indo-Pacific should plan what a Trump presidency might look like and how they will respond to safeguard their security and prosperity at home.
Thomas Pepinsky is the Walter F LaFeber Professor of Government and Public Policy and director of the Southeast Asia Program at Cornell University.
